Secretary of State Revokes, Blocks Visas for Nationals of South Sudan

On April 5, Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement announcing he will revoke U.S. visas for nationals of South Sudan, and that his department will be “taking actions to … prevent further issuance to prevent entry into the United States by” those holding passports from the world’s youngest country. In so doing, he’s telling the world — and likely China in particular — that he will start using his power under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to force “recalcitrant countries” to take their deported nationals back.

Section 243(d) of the INA

Under Section 243(d) of the INA, if the DHS secretary informs the secretary of State that a country won’t accept its nationals whom DHS is attempting to deport, DOS must stop issuing immigrant and/or nonimmigrant visas to nationals of that country until the foreign government begins accepting returns.

 Rubio’s statement never alludes to section 243(d), but a quick read makes clear that he’s relying on it in this instance:

It is time for the Transitional Government of South Sudan to stop taking advantage of the United States. Enforcing our nation’s immigration laws is critically important to the national security and public safety of the United States. Every country must accept the return of its citizens in a timely manner when another country, including the United States, seeks to remove them.

South Sudan

The country in question, South Sudan, has not been an independent nation for long, tracing its birth to July 2011, when the 10 southernmost states in Sudan declared independence after a bloody civil war.

As BBC has noted, “Independence did not bring conflict in South Sudan to an end.” Two years after the country joined the community of nations with its capital at Juba, a fight began between the president and vice president that led to five more years of conflict.

The Wall Street Journal reported on April 6 that things are not exactly settled there. President Salva Kiir’s defense minister headed a cadre of troops that went to the residence of First Vice President Riek Machar last week and detained him, stoking new fears of a civil war.

The CIA Factbook describes South Sudan, home to more than 12 million residents, as “one of the world’s poorest countries”, ranking “among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories”.

According to DHS, 138 nationals of the country entered the United States in FY 2023 on visitor visas, and six failed to depart as expected, giving the country a high “overstay rate” of 4.35 percent. The overstay rate for the 81 students from South Sudan two fiscal years ago was even higher, nearly 20 percent.

As an aside, Khaman Maluach, freshman center on Duke University’s basketball team, is likely the most famous South Sudanese national in the United States. Maluach’s Blue Devils were eliminated by the University of Houston Cougars in a stunning NCAA “Final Four” finish on Saturday night, but as I’ll explain below, it’s doubtful he’s going anywhere anytime soon, Rubio’s announcement notwithstanding.

“Recalcitrant Countries”, the “Removal Period”, and the Laken Riley Act

All of these factors — South Sudan’s distance from the United States, the relatively few nationals of the country who come here, and its high overstay rate — likely contributed to the secretary’s decision to place a visa target on its back.

He’s almost definitely sending a message to other and larger “recalcitrant countries”, governments that ignore their obligations to accept their deported citizens back. Recalcitrant countries have long impeded deportations, but the issue has gained new urgency of late.

Section 241(a)(2) of the INA requires DHS to take aliens ordered removed into immediate custody and to deport them within 90 days, the so-called “removal period”.

That detention-and-removal protocol has been largely ignored in the past. Few non-detained aliens are taken into custody as soon as an immigration judge orders them removed, and even fewer are deported during that removal period.

The “Laken Riley Act”, the first bill passed in the current Congress and the first signed by President Trump in his second term, will change all that.

That’s because section 3(e) of that act empowers state attorneys general to file suit in federal court to force DHS to arrest and detain aliens — and criminal aliens in particular — subject to detention under section 241(a)(2) of the INA.

Part of the reason why DHS has dragged its feet in complying with Congress’s removal period rules has to do with those recalcitrant countries. Before the department can deport most aliens, it must first obtain the travel documents that will allow DHS to send them back home.

As I noted in September 2024 while explaining why hundreds of thousands of criminal aliens were still in the United States: “Cuba, India, and China are all notorious for [not providing documents] … but you can add Russia, Vietnam, Venezuela, and numerous others to that list as well.”

Recalcitrant countries had gotten used to blowing off DHS document requests under the Biden-Harris administration, but a few quickly fell in line once Trump returned.

For example, India almost immediately agreed to take back 18,000 of its citizens who had been lingering in post-order status here, and while Colombia balked at accepting its deported nationals six days after Trump’s return, its president quickly backtracked once the White House threatened to raise tariffs on the country and Rubio began imposing visa sanctions.

Pour Encourager le Gouvernement Chinois

But there are still recalcitrant outliers, most notably China.

The New York Times reported in November 2023 that about 100,000 Chinese nationals were then here under final orders of removal, a total that’s almost definitely risen given that CBP encountered nearly 33,000 other inadmissible Chinese nationals in the interim.

Chinese nationals are the third-largest immigrant group in the United States (after Mexican and Indian nationals) according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), and more than 238,400 students from that country (including Hong Kong and Macau) were enrolled in universities and colleges here in the 2023 to 2024 school year.

As with South Sudan, Rubio could have revoked those visas and shut down U.S. consular processing in Guangzhou and Shanghai to force China to start accepting its deportees back.

That action, however, would have riled churning financial markets and cut off at the knees a U.S. higher education industry that heavily depends on Chinese nationals — most of whom pay full tuition and many of whom serve as researchers and assistants.

Instead, to paraphrase Voltaire, Rubio is likely using visa sanctions against South Sudan not just to force compliance by Juba, but more importantly pour encourager le gouvernement Chinois, to prod Beijing into handing over the thousands of passports DHS has already sought from the Chinese government.

Past Practices

More limited visa restrictions on such smaller countries were common under Trump I, and to a lesser extent under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, as well.

Bush used them in 2001 to force Guyana to take back 113 of its criminal nationals, while Obama placed visa sanctions on Gambian officials to compel them to accept returnees in response to a July 2016 hearing before the House Oversight Committee titled “Recalcitrant Countries: Denying Visas to Countries that Refuse to Take Back their Deported Nationals”.

In September 2017, Trump’s State Department announced sanctions under section 243(d) on four countries: Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

Those sanctions, however, only applied to visitor visas for Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials; visitor visas for Eritreans; student, exchange visitor, and visitor visas for Guinean government officials and their family members; and visitor visas for Sierra Leonean foreign affairs and immigration officials.

Restrictions on visitor visas for Burmese and Laotian government officials were next announced in July 2018, followed by 243(d) limits on visitor visas for Ghanian legislative and executive branch employees in January 2019 and Pakistani senior officials in April 2019.

Finally, visa sanctions were imposed on Burundian nationals in June 2020, with exceptions for diplomatic and United Nations officials.

Trump ended the 243(d) restrictions on Guinea in August 2018 and Ghana in January 2020 after they came into compliance, and Biden lifted the sanctions on Laos in February 2022. Pakistan apparently rolled off the list at some point, but the rest of those sanctions appear to still be in effect.

If anything, that simply shows the limits of more restrictive section 243(d) regimes like the ones imposed under the first Trump administration. Which is likely why Rubio is not only barring future visas but revoking current ones for South Sudan nationals now and doing so across the board.

South Sudanese nationals currently in visa status here and not otherwise running afoul of our laws likely won’t be forced to leave. If they fall out of status, either because their periods of admission have expired or they commit some offense that renders them removable, however, they should start looking for an exit, and quickly.

Rubio’s right about It being time for South Sudan to stop taking advantage of the United States. That’s a common Trump refrain but one particularly true for a country that won’t accept its deported nationals. South Sudan’s not the only recalcitrant country, so expect more such sweeping visa restrictions to follow.