Controversial DHS Program Allows Foreign Students to Train in Sensitive Fields

America’s foreign student program poses a significant national security risk that has gone unaddressed by both the legislative and executive branches, despite explosive growth, new technologies, emerging threats, and the development of a controversial program by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that allows foreign nationals to train in sensitive fields for years beyond graduation. This report shines a light on that controversial program, revealing major security concerns that threaten America’s future.

The practice of foreign students studying in the United States for degrees in sensitive subjects has long been a concern of Congress. For example, Congress has prohibited foreign students from Iran from studying in preparation for a career in Iran’s energy sector, nuclear science, nuclear engineering, and related fields.

Since that prohibition, the foreign student program has grown dramatically, with over 1.5 million foreign students in the United States as of 2023. As global political concerns have shifted, and new sensitive fields of study have emerged, it stands to reason that Congress may want to consider barring foreign students from additional nations from studying and training in a wider range of fields.

For example, a recent report from the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce found “that due to a lack of legal guardrails around federally funded research, hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. federal research funding over the last decade have contributed” to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) “strategic goals by helping the PRC achieve advancements in dual-use, critical, and emerging technologies like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, fourth-generation nuclear weapons technology, and semiconductor technology” and that the PRC’s strategy includes acquiring “U.S. technology and expertise through joint institutes between U.S. research universities” and PRC entities.

Amid the shift in global politics and emerging technologies, DHS has developed a controversial program that allows foreign students to train in their field of study for up to six years beyond graduation. This training consists of employment at a workplace that may, itself, be a sensitive location, such as a university research lab, a tech-focused company, or a military-related institution, for example. Over half a million foreign students from across the globe are currently employed through DHS’s Optional Practical Training (OPT) program, many of whom are training in a wide variety of sensitive fields, including nuclear engineering, undersea warfare, cyber warfare, nanotechnology, and others listed within this report.

The entire OPT program, which has grown to become one of America’s largest foreign-worker programs, is managed entirely by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and has no oversight from other parts of the government, such as the Department of Labor or the Department of Commerce, which generally have a significant role to play in congressionally created foreign-worker programs. The result is that many national security threats that might otherwise be detected by various parts of the government are likely going unaddressed.

The Optional Practical Training Program

DHS’s controversial Optional Practical Training (OPT) program, developed by regulation, allows foreign students to obtain work authorization to “train” for up to three years beyond graduation, following two different degrees (for a total of six years of work authorization). As of Fiscal Year 2023, there were 539,382 foreign students authorized to work through one of three versions of practical training. This rivals the total number of foreign workers in the H-1B program, for example, which has seen totals above and below this number, depending on the year. Considering the explosive growth in the program and the fact that there is no annual cap, there is a strong possibility that DHS’s practical training program will soon become consistently the largest foreign-worker program in America.

The practical training program is made up of three types of practical training managed by ICE’s foreign student division, and the main requirement is that the job matches up to the student’s field of study. The largest is simply referred to as Optional Practical Training (OPT), which allows foreign students to work for up to one year beyond graduation. There are currently 276,452 foreign students who have received employment authorization to work under this version of the program. This employment can be with any employer.

The explosive growth in OPT and the lack of an annual cap mean that it could soon become consistently the largest foreign-worker program.

The second largest version, and the main subject of this report, is a science, technology, engineering, and math version of OPT, called STEM OPT, which is applied as an extension of the one-year OPT, allowing for an additional two years of work authorization (for a total of three years) for foreign students who obtain degrees in a STEM field. There are currently 122,101 foreign students who have received employment authorization under STEM OPT. When DHS first developed STEM OPT, it estimated that only around 12,000 foreign students would take advantage of the program each year; this would turn out to be a wild underestimation.

Finally, there is Curricular Practical Training (CPT), which allows foreign students to work while still enrolled in classes, prior to graduation. There are currently 140,829 foreign students who have received employment authorization to work under the CPT program.

The program is controversial for a number of reasons outside the national security concerns described herein, including the fact that it has resulted in very significant fraud with thousands of foreign students falsifying DHS records, the fact that the program has no annual cap like other foreign-worker programs, the fact that DHS has not fulfilled a regulatory pledge to protect U.S. workers, and the fact that the program creates a $4 billion annual tax emption for employers hiring foreign students over U.S. citizens.

The OPT program was expanded by the Bush and Obama administrations in direct response to Microsoft’s Bill Gates seeking increases in foreign labor, and, in fact, DHS explained that this program was developed specifically to operate as an end-run around the congressional limits on the H-1B visa program, which has a cap of 85,000 new work authorizations each year. Ultimately, with a lack of an annual cap and explosive growth unanticipated by DHS, the concern is that the program has become one of the largest foreign-worker programs in the nation with no congressional oversight, no Department of Labor involvement, and none of the types of limits built into other foreign-worker programs — and it is run by ICE, a law enforcement agency that doesn’t have the appropriate staff to run a foreign-worker program.

Additionally, the program has been plagued with significant fraud since its inception, with thousands of foreign nationals reporting to DHS employment at worksites that do not actually exist. Fraud became a significant part of the OPT programs from the outset, leading to a number of local and national media investigations. The fraud was not subtle, with blatantly phony places of employment entered into the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the most significant post-9/11 database designed to track these individuals. Yet thousands of foreign nationals, many from problematic countries, have been able to remain in the United States and remain undetected through the OPT programs.

A DHS report from the Ombudsman of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the agency responsible for issuing OPT work authorization, detailed additional espionage-related concerns and related vulnerabilities in the OPT program. The ombudsman concluded that “there appears to be a high risk” that the OPT program “is being used as a means for strategic adversaries to conduct espionage and technology transfer from the United States”.

The STEM Degree List

In order to clarify exactly which degrees qualify as STEM and subsequently allow foreign students to train for up to six years beyond graduation under the STEM OPT program, DHS maintains a list of qualifying degrees called the “DHS STEM Designated Degree Program List” (the STEM List). ICE’s foreign student division publishes an updated version of this list annually.

DHS defines “STEM” in the regulation as follows:

The term “science, technology, engineering or mathematics field” means a field included in the Department of Education’s Classification of Instructional Programs taxonomy within the two-digit series or successor series containing engineering, biological sciences, mathematics, and physical sciences, or a related field. In general, related fields will include fields involving research, innovation, or development of new technologies using engineering, mathematics, computer science, or natural sciences (including physical, biological, and agricultural sciences).

The STEM List contains 16 pages of degrees, and many are what one would expect to find in a list of STEM-related fields of study, including computer programming, engineering, chemistry, mathematics, and multiple specific versions of each.

However, the list also contains a number of very sensitive fields of study that have raised alarm within DHS, from military-related fields to nuclear-related fields. The following degrees, which the STEM OPT program allows foreign nationals to train in for years beyond graduation, are only some of the sensitive fields contained on the DHS-approved STEM List (the definitions of the degrees are from the Department of Education):

• Cyber/Electronic Operations and Warfare. “A program that focuses on the technological and operation aspects of information warfare, including cyber attack and cyber defense. Includes instruction in computer and network security, cryptography, computer forensics, systems security engineering, software applications, threat and vulnerability assessment, wireless networks and satellite communications, tactical and strategic planning, legal and ethical issues, and cyber warfare systems development and acquisition.”
• Undersea Warfare. “A program that focuses on the principles, engineering design and military concepts that govern the operational employment of underwater sensors and weapons systems. Includes instruction in acoustics, electrical, and mechanical engineering; mathematics; meteorology; oceanography; physics; operations analysis; human factors; computer science; and robotics.”
• Engineering Acoustics. “A program that focuses on the application of acoustics and signals processing to undersea and antisubmarine warfare. Includes instruction in acoustics; electrical engineering; the generation, propagation and reception of underwater sound waves; military applications of underwater sound; and acoustic signal processing.”
• Operational Oceanography. “A program that focuses on the study of physical oceanography as applied to the naval tactical and strategic environment and the support of military operations. Includes instruction in atmospheric thermodynamics and radiation propagation, air-ocean fluid dynamics, ocean waves, nearshore environments and processes, ocean acoustics, ocean analysis, tactical oceanography, prediction, and related quantitative and experimental methods.”
• Combat Systems Engineering. “A program that focuses on the application of systems engineering and system architecture to the design and construction of modern combat systems and their integration with each other, with host platforms and with other forces into network-centric warfighting systems. Includes instruction in systems engineering, computer programming, chemical systems, biological systems, material systems, human factors, combat environments, sensor systems, threat and system risk assessment, conventional and unconventional weapons, combat simulation, reliability and maintenance, testing, engineering project management, strategic planning and applications to aerospace, ground, and naval combat systems.”
• Aircraft Armament Systems Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of aircraft weapons systems and associated peripherals. Includes instruction in basic science and quantitative methods, computer science, electronics, engineering graphics, fluid power, heavy equipment operation, armament systems, weapon materials and processes, weapon safety, corrosion control, aircraft systems maintenance, and maintenance management.”
• Naval Science and Operational Studies. “A program that focuses on in-depth professional study of naval warfare and related combined/joint operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Includes instruction in maritime security, naval warfighting, naval tactics, naval strategy, operational art, planning and conducting joint operations, command and control, civil-military relations, information networking, leadership, ocean and nearshore operations, and related subjects.”
• Directed Energy Systems. “A program that focuses on the study of lasers and other directed energy phenomena and their application to the creation of energy beam weapons systems. Includes instruction in photonics, electro-optics, microwave phenomena, laser chemistry, spectroscopy, chemical lasers, fibre lasers, imaging and optics, laser propagation and control, laser communication, infrared remote sensing, modeling and simulation, and related technologies.”
• Low-Observables and Stealth Technology. “A program that focuses on the application of electromagnetic field theory, electro-optics and materials science to the reduction of radar, optical and acoustic signatures of weapons systems. Includes instruction in computational electromagnetics, electro-optics, acoustics, guided wave theory, radiation capture, antenna applications in layered environments, material characterization, radar cross-section analysis, sonar signature analysis, non-destructive testing, remote sensing, and applications to specific weapons systems and operational environments.”
• Space Systems Operations. “A program that focuses on the design, development, and operation of missiles, satellites and other space-based systems for military purposes. Includes instruction in the military applications of space, space technology, aerospace engineering, systems architecture, orbital mechanics, launch and retrieval systems, ground support systems, satellite communications, and space-based sensor systems.”
• Missile and Space Systems Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of rocket systems, guided missiles, and space vehicles as well as related systems. Includes instruction in engineering mechanics, engineering graphics, materials and processes, electronics, propellant and guidance systems, control systems, fluid power, nuclear and conventional weapons systems, hazardous materials, non-destructive inspection and testing, quality assurance, safety procedures and maintenance management.”
• Munitions Systems/Ordinance Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of ground or sea-based weapons systems, ordinance and munitions. Includes instruction in basic sciences, electronics, systems technology, fluid power, computer science, conventional weapons systems, nuclear weapons systems, munitions systems, storage and safety, equipment operation, guidance and control systems, hazardous materials, corrosion control, nondestructive testing and quality control, and maintenance management.”
• Radar Communications and Systems Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of air, sea and ground-based radar systems. Includes instruction in electronic principles and digital techniques, transistors and solid-state component theory, radar systems; maintenance technology, data processing systems, wiring and circuit schematics, maintenance management, safety procedures, and applications to specific systems and services.”
• Intelligence, General. “A program that focuses on the principles and techniques of intelligence acquisition, analysis and exploitation. Includes instruction in intelligence organizations, the intelligence cycle, intelligence operations planning, intelligence analysis and reporting, intelligence methods, electronic and signals intelligence, operations and communications security, human intelligence management, intelligence chain of command, information exploitation and psychological warfare, and the relationship to national security policy and strategy.”
• Strategic Intelligence. “A program that focuses on the management, analysis and use of national-level, theatre-level, and international intelligence and related policy issues. Includes instruction in intelligence organization and management, strategic uses of intelligence, management of intelligence systems and assets, command and control, joint intelligence operations, electronic and signals intelligence, threat assessment and estimation, intelligence analysis and reporting, counterintelligence, and studies of specific regions and situations.”
• Signal/Geospatial Intelligence. “A program that focuses on the theory, technology and operational aspects of collecting, processing and exploiting remote-sensed, radar, acoustic and other forms of signals intelligence. Includes instruction in applied physics, wave propagation and capture, radar systems, acoustics and underwater systems, infrared systems, synthetic aperture systems, collection and processing systems, signal phenomenology, signal analysis and exploitation, and applications to specific intelligence problems.”
• Command & Control (C3, C4I) Systems and Operations. “A program that focuses on the theory, technology and operational use of information and decision systems in support of battlefield, theatre, and global strategic operations. Includes instruction in applied mathematics and statistics, computer systems, real-time analysis and decision systems, surveillance and navigation systems, information and communications technology, information security, situational awareness, system integration, joint operations and applications to specific command problems and services.”
• Information Operations/Joint Information Operations. “A program that focuses on the strategic and operational use of information relative to the support of military and strategic policy and objectives. Includes instruction in information technology, decision theory and applications, military operations, command and control technology, network operations, network systems integration, computer network defense, space communications technology, and applications to specific military operational tasks.”
• Information/Psychological Warfare and Military Media Relations. “A program that focuses on the support of military and strategic operations and policy via the use of information as a tool of statecraft and warfighting. Includes instruction in information technology and systems, information security, command and control, satellite communications, global information dissemination, communications and media management, intelligence, psychological warfare, strategic planning, security policy and doctrine, and applications to specific operations, services, and scenarios.”
• Aerospace Ground Equipment Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology, and maintenance of ground-based systems and equipments used to support aviation flight operations and space operations. Includes instruction in computer science, electronics, basic sciences and quantitative methods, air conditioning and refrigeration, corrosion control, fluid power, hazardous materials, industrial safety, maintenance management, vehicle and equipment operation, and applications to specific ground support systems.”
• Air and Space Operations Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of systems and equipment used in aerospace operations. Includes instruction in astronomy and astronautics, solid state theory, air and space operations, electronics, computer science, aviation and space flight safety, life support systems, flight operations management systems, programming, propulsion systems, weaponry, maintenance management and applications to specific systems and operations.”
• Aircraft Armament Systems Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and maintenance of aircraft weapons systems and associated peripherals. Includes instruction in basic science and quantitative methods, computer science, electronics, engineering graphics, fluid power, heavy equipment operation, armament systems, weapon materials and processes, weapon safety, corrosion control, aircraft systems maintenance, and maintenance management.”
• Explosive Ordinance/Bomb Disposal. “A program that focuses on the identification, containment, analysis and neutralization of explosive devices. Includes instruction in nuclear science, computer science, ordinance and bomb systems, electronics, computer science, industrial radiography, non-destructive testing, equipment operation, inventory management, investigative techniques, forensics, schematic interpretation, safety procedures, site containment and emergency medicine.”
• Joint Command/Task Force (C3, C4I) Systems. “A program that focuses on the principles, technology and operational use of command and control (C3, C4I) systems as applied to joint and combined military operations involving unified commands. Includes instruction in information technology, communications systems, network systems and architecture, systems engineering, C3 and C4I doctrine and policy, C3 and C4I systems management, intelligence, operational and strategic planning, interagency operations, operational security and deception.”
• Military Information Systems Technology. “A program that focuses on the principles, design and application of computer and networking technology to the military environment. Includes instruction in planning; program development; graphical user interfaces; rapid prototyping; program construction; data types, operations; control flow; arrays; records; file I/O; database access; event-driven OOP structures; and enabling global-networked communications, including databases, systems analysis and design, decision support systems, and network security.”
• Nuclear Engineering. “A program that prepares individuals to apply mathematical and scientific principles to the design, development and operational evaluation of systems for controlling and manipulating nuclear energy, including nuclear power plant design, fission reactor design, fusion reactor design, reactor control and safety systems design, power transfer systems, containment vessels and structures design; and the analysis of related engineering problems such as fission and fusion processes, human and environmental factors, construction, and operational considerations.”
• Nuclear Engineering Technology/Technician. “A program that prepares individuals to apply basic engineering, knowledge and technical skills in support of engineer and other professionals operating nuclear facilities and engaged in nuclear applications and safety procedures. Includes instruction in physics, nuclear science, nuclear systems, nuclear plant and systems design, radiological safety, radiological applications, and applicable law and regulations.”
• Nuclear Physics. “A program that focuses on the scientific study of the properties and behavior of atomic nuclei. Includes instruction in nuclear reaction theory, quantum mechanics, energy conservation, nuclear fission and fusion, strong and weak forces, nuclear modeling, nuclear decay, nucleon scattering, pairing, photon and electron reactions, the physics of nuclear effects, statistical methods, and research equipment operation and maintenance.”
• Nuclear/Nuclear Power Technology/Technician. “A program that prepares individuals to apply scientific principles and technical skills in support of research scientists and operating engineers engaged in the running of nuclear reactors, and in nuclear materials processing and disposal. Includes instruction in basic nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, monitoring and safety procedures, radioactive materials handling and disposal, equipment maintenance and operation, and record keeping.”

Concerns About Additional Degrees

Subject matter experts at DHS are aware of national security concerns regarding the military- and nuclear-related degrees listed above, but they are also aware of additional sensitive degrees on the list that raise national security concerns.

Additional sensitive fields of concern include, for example, nanotechnology; artificial intelligence; virology; infectious disease; cloud computing; aerospace, aeronautical, and astronautical/space engineering; chemical and biomolecular engineering; atomic/molecular physics; plasma and high-temperature physics; water resources engineering; biochemical engineering; biotechnology; energy systems engineering; and power plant engineering.

DHS is aware of national security concerns regarding military- and nuclear-related degrees, but there are additional sensitive degrees that raise national security concerns.

Also of concern are sensitive fields involving material sciences that are needed for producing and maintaining various items with national security implications, like satellites, ships, and weapons; for example: materials engineering; laser and optical engineering; metallurgical engineering; polymer/plastics engineering; polymer chemistry; ceramic sciences and engineering; mining and mineral engineering; naval architecture and marine engineering; ocean engineering; petroleum engineering; systems engineering; textile sciences and engineering; industrial engineering; electromechanical engineering; mechatronics, robotics, and automation engineering; optics/optical sciences; acoustics; and condensed matter and materials physics.

Also included on the list are sensitive fields involving the food supply: food technology and processing; food science and technology; dairy science; animal health; agronomy and crop science; soil microbiology; veterinary infectious diseases; veterinary pathology and pathobiology; and agricultural engineering.

This is not a complete list of sensitive degrees contained in the STEM List. The program continues to operate without any significant changes and there has been no effort by DHS under the Biden administration to prohibit foreign students from any country from training for years in these sensitive fields.

What Countries Are These Foreign Students From?

The total number of foreign students who are working in sensitive fields, by nationality, is not part of the public record, and it doesn’t appear that Congress has ever asked ICE to provide a complete count. If asked, it is likely that SEVP leadership would report that, for at least some of these sensitive fields, the number of foreign students training in them is small. Still, it takes only a few bad actors to create significant national security threats.

The OPT programs are available to foreign students from any country. Though the total numbers have shifted since the pandemic, and varied by nation, China and India have been the top two countries of origin for many years and they make up the majority of foreign students studying in the United States. In 2019, for example, China was the top country of origin of foreign students, with 474,497 total students, and India was in second place, with 249,221.

The table below shows the top 40 countries of origin of all foreign students as of 2023. The full table is available online.

ICE does not provide a table for all OPT programs by nationality, but a table on nationality for foreign students authorized for STEM OPT is available online. As of 2023, there were 47,693 foreign students from India and 28,878 from China participating in STEM OPT. It is important to remember that many foreign students training in the regular, one-year OPT are training in a STEM-related degree and will eventually transition to being counted in the three-year STEM OPT version of the program. A complete count of fields of study, including a breakdown by the version of practical training by nationality could be requested by any member of Congress interested in drilling down further.

Country-of-Origin Concerns

There are many national security-related lenses one might use when evaluating this data. For example, the United States officially identifies six “foreign adversaries” and defines them as those that “have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons” (15 CFR 791.4). This list is made up of five countries and Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime).

There were 352,684 foreign students in the United States from these countries as of 2023; specifically, from China (330,365), Iran (13,855), Russia (8,302), Cuba (162), and none from North Korea. There are also 5,865 foreign students from Venezuela, though the extent to which they have any connection to the Maduro Regime might be a question for agencies involved in vetting foreign nationals seeking entry to the United States.

The Biden National Security Strategy entirely ignored the education and training in sensitive fields of students from strategic competitors.

And then there are countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, which have sent 14,447 foreign students here; Iran (13,855), Syria (430), and Cuba (162). The government defines such nations as those that “have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism”. Whether DHS and the State Department can adequately vet foreign students arriving from these nations is a serious question.

Another example is the potential implications of Export Administration Regulations (EAR) issued by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under laws relating to the control of certain exports, reexports, and activities. The term “exports” has a broad definition under EAR regulations, and the release of technology to a foreign national in the United States “through such means as demonstration or oral briefing” is deemed an export. The regulations “are intended to serve the national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other interests of the United States”. There are a number of different countries that have limits on a variety of topics, from nuclear-based technologies, to materials processing, to electronics and computers, to sensors and lasers, and aerospace technologies, to name a few.

A review of one category — “Missile Technology” — illustrates the scope of the issue. There are missile technology controls on countries that have sent a total of 425,848 foreign students to the United States to study and/or train through OPT; specifically, Bahrain (413), Belarus (739), China (330,365), Egypt (5,275), Iran (13,855), Iraq (523), Israel (3,753), Jordan (4,398), Kuwait (6,930), Lebanon (2,377), Libya (647), Macau (480), Oman (2,219), Pakistan (13,676), Qatar (570), Russia (8,302), Saudi Arabia (22,589), Syria (430), United Arab Emirates (1,920), Venezuela (5,865), Yemen (522). The number of students from these countries who are studying and training in missile technology is something that the Department of Commerce should be tracking with the assistance of DHS, but there is no evidence of the BIS working closely with DHS on employment in this field (or other sensitive fields) obtained by foreign nationals through OPT.

The U.S. government does not appear to be operating with one voice on issues related to the spread of technology and its use in foreign nations. For example, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released a report in January 2024, highlighting how China is using technology — obtained at least in part through U.S. exports — to abuse human rights. The report explains that the Chinese government “has been a leading player in implementing and promoting techno-authoritarianism at home and abroad” and that “Chinese authorities have aggressively employed ‘smart city’ technologies — including artificial intelligence (AI), big data, biometric collection, and facial, voice, and gait recognition — to carry out mass surveillance throughout China.” The report notes that the Chinese government is using these technologies to target religious groups in China and globally, and has exported its “smart city” products and services and its underlying techno-authoritarian approach to over 100 countries, posing “a significant challenge to the protection of human rights, including religious freedom, globally.” The report concludes that the “U.S. government and partners must continue to tighten export controls of critical technologies to China.” Despite this, DHS continues to allow foreign students from China to study and train in these fields.

In the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, the administration explained that the United States “must ensure strategic competitors cannot exploit foundational American and allied technologies, know-how, or data to undermine American and allied security”. To accomplish this, the administration called for “modernizing and strengthening our export control and investment screening mechanisms”, among other strategies. The strategy mentions a number of countries, including China and Russia, but it entirely ignores the education and training of students from these countries in sensitive fields.

Looking at this from yet another angle, many foreign students arrive from countries that have been issued a travel advisory by the State Department. The highest level is a “Do Not Travel” advisory, which the State Department describes as “the highest advisory level due to greater likelihood of life-threatening risks” and recommends that American who do travel to these countries “write a will prior to traveling and leave DNA samples in case of worst-case scenarios”. Concerns in these countries include, for example, terrorism, kidnappings, and violent crime. Much of this is regional in nature, and it’s unlikely foreign students would bring some of these threats to the United States, but the level of risk would be dependent on the vetting capabilities of the U.S. government. There are 45,578 foreign students from these countries in the United States as of 2023.

ICE Is Not Working to Stop This Threat

It is important to understand that ICE is not actively tracking this issue because, under the OPT regulation, there is no prohibition on foreign students from problematic countries training in sensitive fields. ICE’s foreign student division is primarily responsible for addressing violations of their regulations, and studying and training in sensitive fields is not a violation of those regulations.

Compounding the issue is that ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) component is primarily focused on criminal violations and terrorism-related issues, which, without more, does not automatically implicate foreign students training in sensitive fields. HSI explains that its national security investigations “primarily involve terrorism and foreign intelligence threats”. These foreign intelligence threats, HSI explains further, are those that “involve other countries collecting information to disrupt U.S. government functions, influence foreign policy, steal technology and trade secrets, and undertake other activities to harm the United States”. In other words, only where a foreign student is working on behalf of another nation and actively concealing an effort to steal technology and trade secrets and transfer it to that nation, is HSI potentially going to be involved.

ICE is not actively tracking this issue because, under the OPT regulation, there is no prohibition on foreign students from problematic countries training in sensitive fields. 

Again, because under the OPT program it is not a criminal act for a foreign student from a problematic country to train in a sensitive field and bring that knowledge back to his home country, HSI will not stop the activity without clear direction from Congress or DHS leadership and a complete overhaul of the OPT program. As explained by HSI, its SEVIS Exploitation Section “identifies suspect groups, organizations, educational institutions and individuals through strategic analysis and refers leads to field offices for criminal investigation of terrorism-related activity, foreign intelligence operations, transnational organized crime or immigration fraud”. Without more, a foreign student who trains in a sensitive field and returns to his home country and spreads that knowledge is unlikely to be stopped by the SEVIS Exploitation Section.

The potential for foreign students who train for years in a sensitive field to have access to important technology and trade secrets is significant. HSI cannot stop this access from occurring since it is how OPT is designed to operate. Instead, HSI is relegated to investigating instances of outright theft, for example, where a foreign student attempts to clandestinely transfer technology out of the workplace and into the hands of a foreign government. But activity like this can be very difficult for law enforcement to uncover and it is rational to conclude that many national security threats created by OPT are never caught. The program has created an obvious threat that HSI simply cannot be expected to fully rein in through investigations and arrests.

Access to Sensitive Degrees Is a Key Problem

A central requirement in the practical training program is that the employment a foreign student obtains must match up to the student’s field of study. A student who obtains a degree in nuclear engineering, for example, would be allowed under SEVP regulations to work at a nuclear plant, a science lab focused on nuclear energy, or any type of worksite that touches on nuclear science. This requirement is applied very liberally (e.g., music majors are permitted to do gig work playing an instrument at a bar a few days a week).

Any effort DHS might make to address fraud and national security concerns in the practical training program, either by narrowing or eliminating the program altogether, would not address the underlying issue of foreign students studying in sensitive fields. Naturally, if it’s a national security risk to allow foreign students to train in sensitive fields, then it’s arguably also a risk to allow foreign students to study these fields in the first place.

Whether or not DHS has the ability or authority to prohibit foreign students from studying in certain fields does not appear to have been explored. However, DHS does issue the Form I-20 “Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status”, which is a key document for foreign students and it does require students to list their chosen majors. DHS also certifies schools to enroll foreign students and could arguably add limits and requirements to that process. DHS would have to review all degrees for national security concerns and then develop an appropriate policy, which might apply to all foreign students, or apply differently to different nationalities. The result would be that foreign students would be unable to obtain degrees in certain fields, and subsequently, unable to obtain practical training in those fields.

If it’s a national security risk to allow foreign students to train in sensitive fields, then it’s arguably also a risk to allow foreign students to study these fields in the first place.

A more comprehensive way to address this could come from the legislative branch. In 2012, President Obama signed the “Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012” (H.R. 1905), which, among other things, denies admission to and excludes from the United States any “Iranian citizen seeking to enter the United States to study at an institution of higher education to prepare for a career in Iran’s energy or nuclear sectors”. Since then, global politics have changed significantly, and new sensitive majors are being offered at college campuses, raising the question of whether Congress should expand this type of prohibition to other nationalities and other fields of study. Congress could evaluate all available fields of study and make a determination on whether it is in the interests of the United States to continue allowing foreign students from other countries to study and train in these fields.

By prohibiting study in a field, a foreign student generally would also not be eligible to train in that field via DHS’s practical training programs because such employment must generally match up with the student’s field of study. However, because of the flexibility in the practical training regulations, a foreign student who obtained a degree in mathematics or engineering might still obtain a job at a nuclear facility, provided the job is related to mathematics or engineering. Furthermore, the practical training program largely relies on foreign students and their school officials accurately describing what they are studying and where they are working. In other words, prohibiting foreign students from studying sensitive fields may address the issue to some extent — and it might be a worthwhile effort on its own, outside of the practical training context — but significant oversight from DHS would still be needed, and the track record on DHS’s oversight is not good considering the significant fraud within the practical training program.

It should be noted that universities are not necessarily going to be willing partners in any national security-focused effort from Congress or the executive branch, as recent actions by some schools reveal. For example, in 2015, three years after the act prohibiting Iranian students from studying nuclear and related fields became law, the University of Massachusetts Amherst (UMass Amherst) attempted to meet the statutory prohibition and send out a notice describing the procedures it would be following. The university stated that the law was “unfortunate” and that it “directly conflicts with our institutional values and principles” but also that there “are significant penalties, both civil and criminal, that could potentially impact faculty, staff and students, for violations of this Act” and explained that UMass Amherst “has determined that it will no longer admit Iranian national students to specific programs in the College of Engineering (i.e., Chemical Engineering, Electrical & Computer Engineering, Mechanical & Industrial Engineering) and in the College of Natural Sciences (i.e., Physics, Chemistry, Microbiology, and Polymer Science & Engineering)”. Within days of this announcement, the university overturned the policy.

A UMass Amherst vice chancellor announced that “after further consultation and deliberation” it would adopt a “less restrictive policy”, a move celebrated by the Persian Students Association at UMass Amherst and the National Iranian American Council, the latter of which told the New York Times, “There’s nothing in the law that says the school has to ensure that it is upholding these visa provisions.” The extent to which DHS or Congress believe universities like UMass Amherst are in compliance with federal law is unclear.

How to Fix This

The OPT program was created by DHS through regulation, and DHS can make adjustments to the program to address these concerns. One option would be for DHS to publish a new regulation that limits the OPT program to a six-month stint available to students in degree programs where all students, U.S. and foreign, are required to conduct practical training as a condition of obtaining the degree. Limiting the time period would ensure the OPT program remains an actual training program, and stop its development into a massive foreign-worker program. It would also likely reduce national security threats by limiting the amount of time problematic foreign nationals would be able to train in sensitive fields. DHS could also eliminate the program altogether.

Bottom line, DHS is running a program that creates significant national security threats with little to no input from Congress and other agencies that have a role to play in protecting the nation.

DHS could also limit the degrees that qualify for the OPT program through regulation. Considering the number of potentially problematic fields of study, DHS would have to make significant cuts. Even if DHS were to go this route, there remains the problem of schools determining whether a field of study qualifies for employment, and the proper reporting of employment to DHS. For example, a foreign student might enter the United States in a non-sensitive degree area and seek employment through the OPT program in a job that is nonetheless sensitive in nature; DHS would continue to rely largely on school officials to prevent this from occurring.

Congress could fix some of the problems related to the OPT program if it were to limit the fields of study available to foreign students. Such a change in law would not require Congress to mention the OPT program at all, and it would nonetheless reduce some of the threats created by the OPT program.

ICE can also conduct significant enforcement operations to uncover and eliminate threats within the OPT program. This would include visits to worksites and schools, but it would likely require a joint effort with other federal agencies that have experience with espionage and related threats. This type of effort would be a significant strain on resources from many parts of the federal government, and it would have to continue indefinitely without significant changes in policy.

Bottom line, DHS is running a program that creates significant national security threats with little to no input from Congress and other parts of the federal government that have a role to play in protecting the nation. If the OPT program continues to operate as it currently is, DHS will continue to undermine efforts aimed at protecting America’s national security interests.